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TheObjectives: The objective was to evaluate a new mechanism for reporting and
classifying patient safety events to increase reporting and identify patient safety
priorities.
Methods: A voluntary patient safety event reporting system accessible by all health
care workers was implemented in the Cardiothoracic Intensive Care and Post
Anesthesia Care Units. Information collected included patient identifiers; date, time,
and location of report and event; type and description of event; and severity score.
Narrative descriptions of events were analyzed and coded to describe when in the
care process the event occurred, what occurred, and a causal classification of why
the event occurred.
Results: A total of 163 reports describing 157 events were received. These included
121 events reported from the intensive care unit (25.3 reported events per 1000
patient-days), a 3-fold increase compared with the preexisting on-line reporting
system. A total of 113 reports (69%) came from nurses, 31 from physicians (19%),
and 10 from other staff (6%). A majority of events (85, 54%) reached the patient but
caused no harm. Multiple causes were identified for the majority of events. The most
frequent causes were related to human factors (48%) and organizational factors
(34%).
Conclusions: Health care workers were willing to use the patient safety event
reporting system, which yielded a broad range of patient safety data. Patient safety
events are multifaceted and often have multiple causal factors. Application of a
causal classification model for patient safety event coding in the intensive care and
preoperative and postoperative care units is feasible and facilitates local communi-
cation of important event-related information.
T he Institute of Medicine’s report,1 To Err Is Human: Building a Safer HealthSystem, focused attention sharply on medical error. The conclusion that moreAmericans may die as a result of medical errors in hospitals than from
injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents is alarming,1,2 but others suggest that
harm resulting from medical errors may even be underestimated by the Institute of
Medicine.3 Although studies specific to the intensive care unit (ICU) setting have
used different terms and measurements for patient safety events, they indicate that
errors and other patient safety events are common in this setting.4-6
In the complex ICU environment patients are at higher risk for errors; thus,
patient safety reporting systems and effective analyses of ICU events are important
parts of an organization’s efforts to improve patient safety.7 Recent recommenda-
tions for patient safety reporting systems call for voluntary, confidential, nonpuni-
tive systems that are easy to use, include near misses, identify causative factors, and
use the information to prevent errors and improve patient safety.1-4,8,9 Additional
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ical error and patient safety event reporting systems.
We hypothesized that a new mechanism for reporting
and analyzing actual and potential patient safety events,
accessible to both physicians and hospital staff, would in-
crease reporting of events and identify patient safety prior-
ities. To test this hypothesis, we developed and implemented a
simple patient safety event reporting tool to encourage report-
ing of medical errors, near misses, and risky situations,
along with a coding system to classify text descriptions of
events and causes of events. This study was conducted in
the spirit of the Institute of Medicine’s recommendation that
voluntary reporting of errors, including those that result in
harm as well as near misses, should be integrated into
standard medical practice.1,3
Materials and Methods
Study Setting and Patients
Barnes-Jewish Hospital is a 1371-bed teaching hospital affiliated
with Washington University School of Medicine, serving eastern
Missouri and southwestern Illinois. This study was conducted in
the hospital’s 17-bed Cardiothoracic Intensive Care Unit (CTICU)
from January 6, 2003, to December 31, 2003, and the 9-bed
Cardiothoracic Post Anesthesia Care Unit (CTPACU) from June 4,
2003, to December 31, 2003. The CTPACU includes preoperative
“holding area” beds as well as postoperative recovery beds for
inpatient and outpatient procedures. Both areas serve adult patients
undergoing cardiac and thoracic surgery, with multidisciplinary
teams providing patient care under the supervision of intensivist
physicians. The standard nurse to patient ratio is 1 nurse for every
2 patients, but a 1-to-1 ratio is adopted for unstable patients.
Nurses are the primary users of the hospital’s preexisting Risk
Management Online Event/Incident Entry system, recording self-
reported events and events reported by physicians and other staff.
The on-line system was originally designed to provide information
for risk management, although the data have also been used to
improve patient safety. Reporters select from a predefined list of
events and incidents, such as “lab report delayed” or “missing
sponge,” and may also type in a narrative description of the event.
These reports are not anonymous, and some types of incidents are
required to be reported. Access to computers used to enter reports
is not entirely private in most locations, and patient care areas that
do not have access to the on-line system must use a paper form
instead.
Study Design and Data Collection
General description. The CTICU was 1 of 4 critical care areas
selected to participate in this study of a brief, anonymous reporting
form. Implementation in all areas occurred over a period of 6
months after initial pilot testing in the medical ICU. A description
of the study design and reporting methods was previously pub-
lished by Osmon and colleagues.10 This study was developed as a
result of interviews with nurses, physicians, and pharmacists, and
subsequent focus groups with nurses and physicians. The inter-
views and focus groups addressed health care professionals’ per-
spectives on error reporting in hospitals. Barriers to reporting were
identified, including difficulties using the preexisting on-line sys-
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were also identified and included use of computerized systems,
simplified event reports, and other potential reporting methods.
Two main objectives were identified for this study: to provide a
mechanism for physicians to report medical errors, near misses,
and risky situations, and to provide new knowledge that would
lead to improvements in patient safety.
Study implementation. Approval for this study was obtained
from the Washington University Medical Center Human Studies
Committee. The hospital’s Medical Executive Committee also
approved this study as a patient safety/quality improvement project
as part of the peer review process. Monthly summaries of all
patient safety reports were provided to the Cardiothoracic Services
Quality Improvement Committee to facilitate the identification of
system improvements and other opportunities to prevent patient
safety events.
Any physician or staff member with access to the participating
critical care areas could submit a SAFE Reporting Form for any
patient safety event. Patient safety events were defined as any
situation or event that harmed or had the potential to harm a
patient, resulted in a near miss, or created a risky situation. There
were no limitations on what type of patient safety events could be
reported. The reporting form was designed to be easy to complete
and could be carried in a pocket or on a clipboard until needed.
Data fields on the reporting form included broad categories for
types of events (eg, medication and equipment/product), which
were adapted from the preexisting on-line event/incident reporting
system. General definitions and examples are listed in Table 1.
Free-text fields allowed the reporter to describe what happened,
any perceived causes of the event, and any actions taken to address
or resolve the matter.
Two items on the form comprised a severity scale to assess
potential risk or injury to the patient and how the event affected
patient care. Reported severity was corrected in some cases after
review by at least 1 registered nurse on the study team. During the
course of the study, we solicited anecdotal comments from phy-
sicians and staff to identify barriers to reporting and obtain feed-
back on the reporting form/process. The reporting system to be
implemented differed from the hospital’s on-line system in that all
health care workers had easy access to the reporting system,
reporting forms could be carried easily and completed quickly in
any location, reporting was completely voluntary, and reports
could be submitted anonymously.
Analysis
A comparison of preimplementation and postimplementation re-
porting rates was evaluated in the CTICU. A method for coding all
event descriptions was developed. Reported patient safety event
narratives were coded by a core group of researchers who met
regularly to reach consensus on coding of the more challenging
events. Each narrative was reviewed to determine when the event
occurred in the care process (care process step), what occurred
(brief event description), and why the event occurred (causal
classification). Each text description for an event could have mul-
tiple codes for “when,” “what,” and “why.” Standardized “when”
and “what” codes were developed from the study data and an
analysis of the hospital’s existing reporting system taxonomies.
“What” codes were separated into roots (eg, medication) and
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based on an extension of the Medical Version of the Eindhoven
Classification Model. Researchers received orientation to this
causal classification model with the Medical Event Reporting
System for Transfusion Medicine Reference Manual Version
3.0.11 This reporting system was successfully used by Callum and
colleagues8 to classify near-miss and actual transfusion-related
errors. The Eindhoven category extensions for our study included
specific examples for each Eindhoven code and whether the cause
was definite, probable, or possible. The category extensions were
developed to improve coding consistency; examples are shown in
Table 2.
Data were entered into Microsoft Access (Microsoft Corp,
Redmond, Wash), cleaned, and transferred to SPSS version 12.0
(SPSS Inc, Chicago, Ill) for analysis. Reporting rates are presented
as the number of events reported per 1000 patient days or the
number of events reported per 100 admissions. The chi-square test
was used to compare categorical variables. All tests were 2-tailed.
Results
Event Reporting
During the study period, caregivers submitted 163 reports
TABLE 1. General descriptions, examples, and frequency
Event type Description
Medication Events related to prescribing, dis
administering medications
Test, treatment, procedure Events related to any tests other
laboratory tests, treatments, or
procedures other than surgica
procedures performed in the o
room
Equipment/product Events related to the functioning
availability of any equipment o
Laboratory Events related to diagnostic or o
laboratory tests
Surgery Events related to any surgical pr
including preparation, conduct
procedure, and immediate pos
care
Behavioral/psychiatric Events related to behavior or psy
status of patient, visitors, or ca
Blood products Events related to prescribing, dis
administering blood products
Fall Any witnessed or unwitnessed fa
Other Events that did not fit into any o
categories above
Total for all event types —on 157 events. The reports identified 103 different patients;
The Journal of Thoracic an20 patients (19%) were identified in more than 1 event. The
median number of days from hospital admission to the first
event was 3 days (range, day 1 to day 70). The average
patient age at admission was 59 years (range 20-94 years),
and 57 patients (55%) were male. A total of 121 events were
reported from the CTICU (25.3 reported events per 1000
patient days, or 11.3 reported events per 100 admissions).
This represented a 3-fold increase in reporting compared
with on-line system reporting during the 12-month prein-
tervention period (8.5 events per 1000 patient-days) (rate
ratio 3.01, 95% confidence interval 2.10-4.34, P  .001).
The CTPACU reported 36 events during 7 study months
(1.7 events per 100 admissions). Data for CTPACU events
in the on-line system were reported together with other
postoperative care units, preventing direct comparisons with
that system.
In regard to event location, 105 events (67%) occurred in
the CTICU, 13 events (8%) occurred in the CTPACU, and
39 events (25%) occurred in other areas before the patient’s
arrival or return to the CTICU or CTPACU. Of the 39
pes of events
Examples n (%)
ing, or Wrong or omitted dose,
contraindicated drug
47 (29.9)
ting
Delayed x-ray films, physical therapy,
and so forth; incorrect invasive
line insertions or dressing
changes; inappropriate patient
transfer
33 (21.0)
, and
ducts
Broken beds, chairs, or tables; use
of incorrect tubing; ventilator
failure/malfunction
17 (10.8)
Delayed or missed test results,
wrong test ordered or requested,
incorrect patient identification,
mislabeled or wrong specimen
container used
9 (5.7)
ure
ative
Omission of preoperative test or
procedure, delayed surgical
intervention, procedural errors,
delayed identification of
postoperative complications
9 (5.7)
tric
vers
Combativeness or self-injury,
elopement, intentional or persistent
failure to follow policy
4 (2.5)
ing, or Wrong blood type, mislabeled
product, incorrect patient
identification
4 (2.5)
— 1 (0.6)
— 33 (21.0)
— 157 (100)of ty
pens
than
any
l
pera
, use
r pro
ther
oced
of
toper
chia
regi
pens
ll
f theevents that occurred in other areas, 7 (18%) occurred in the
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assessment area. Most events reported by the CTICU oc-
curred in the CTICU (105/121, 87%), whereas most events
reported by the CTPACU occurred in other areas before the
patient’s arrival (23/36, 64%) (P  .001). Although the
reporter’s identity was optional, 128 reports (79%) included
the reporter’s name and 154 reports (95%) included the
reporter’s job description: 113 nurses (69%), 31 physicians
(19%), and 10 other staff (6%). There were only 7 com-
pletely anonymous reports (4%) (no name or job description
indicated), and these were received during the first 6 months
of the study.
Types of Events and Severity
The most frequently reported types of events included
medication-related events (47, 30%) and test, treatment, or
procedure-related events (33, 21%) (Table 1). Although a
majority of reported events reached the patient but caused
no harm (85, 54%), approximately a quarter documented
some level of temporary harm (34, 22%). Temporary harm
varied widely and included events such as skin tears and
pressure ulcers in intubated patients, patient self-extubation
or catheter dislodgment requiring sedation and reinsertion
of the endotracheal tube and/or central venous catheter, and
changes in respiratory or cardiovascular status requiring life-
TABLE 2. Example classification extensions of Eindhoven
Code Short text Long
Technical factors
TD Design Failure due to
Organizational factors
OP Protocols/procedures Failures relate
availability o
complicated
unrealistic, a
presented)
Human factors
HRC Coordination Lack of task c
the organizasustaining treatments (eg, following the wrong medication/
1137.e4 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Oroute/dose or a delay in identifying or responding to a monitor
alarm). No reported events contributed to permanent harm
or death. Twenty-three risky situations (15%) and 15 near
misses (10%) were reported (Table E1). All reports of risky
situations were submitted by nurses. A majority of events
had no effect (87, 55%) on patient care; 3 events (1.9%)
were unclassifiable in the “effect on care” portion of the
severity scale (2 staffing concerns and 1 event requiring a
change from general to local anesthesia) (Table E1). During
the study period, the hospital’s on-line system documented
54 additional events reported by the CTICU. The majority
caused no harm (20, 37%) or documented temporary harm
(18, 33%).
Classification of Events
When the event occurred in the care process (care
process step). A total of 168 “when” codes were applied to
157 events: The majority (147, 94%) occurred during a
single care process step. Patient safety events that occurred
during a procedure were most common (41/168, 24%),
followed by events during administration of a treatment or
medication (20/168, 12%) and events during passive care
(15/168, 9%) (Table 3). Passive care was defined as any
period during which no health care provider was interacting
s
ription Extension
design Handwritten orders
Need to assist ordering process with patient-
specific decision support
Poorly designed computer software
Equipment design confusing/inadequate
False alarm rate too high
Health care provider can draw up too much
medication
Sound-alike drugs
Need bar-coding
the quality and
protocols (too
curate,
t, poorly
Protocol too complicated
Rounds ordering process not well-defined
Inadequate/missing protocol
Defense function failures for multichannel
pumps
nation within
or team
Second clinician thought first clinician was
handling
Poor communication between clinicians
Patient status declining, no one responded
Poor coordination of patient transfer
between areas/facilities
High workload this shiftcode
desc
poor
d to
f the
, inac
bsen
oordi
tionwith the patient.
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codes describing what occurred were assigned to 157
events: a single code was used to describe 129 events
(82%). More than 1 code was used to describe 28 events
(18%). Root codes (eg, medication) and branch codes (eg,
wrong dose) for all brief event descriptions are presented in
Table E2. Overall, the most common brief event description
was inappropriate procedure (33/192, 17%), followed by
wrong dose of medication (17/192, 9%) and missed assess-
ment (15/192, 8%). Examples of events involving inappro-
priate procedures included (1) an inpatient brought to the
preoperative holding area with false teeth still in place and
(2) an inadvertent insertion of a central venous catheter into
the subclavian artery of a patient with a possible bleeding
diathesis.
Cause of event (causal classification). A total of 430
causes were identified for 157 events; 25 events (16%) had
1 cause, 47 events (30%) had 2 causes, 46 events (29%) had
3 causes, and 39 events (25%) had 4 or more causes. Of
these causes, 74 (17%) were classified as definite, 55 (13%)
as probable, and 301 (70%) as possible. The largest propor-
tion of event causes were thought to be human factors
(205/430, 48%) (Table 4). The most common human factors
were slips (76/205, 37%) such as forgot, distracted, or read
or wrote incorrectly, followed by task coordination failures
(43/205, 21%) such as poor communication. Organizational
factors comprised 34% (144/430) of the causal codes, with
failures related to protocols or procedures being the most
common organizational factor (48/144, 33%), followed by
incomplete or inadequate transfer of knowledge (41/144,
29%). Although the most common causes were human
factors, only 14% (29/205) of these contributed to events
with harm. Approximately 22% (32/144) of organizational
factors, 27% (15/56) of technical factors, and 40% (10/25)
of other factors contributed to patient harm (P  .005).
Discussion
This study suggests that instituting a voluntary, accessible,
anonymous, and nonpunitive event-reporting system results
in increased reporting of patient safety events, which are
common in the intensive care setting. As others have
pointed out during the last decade, the exact frequency and
extent of actual errors or patient safety events in different
health care settings is unknown.12,13 In our study, both
physicians and staff members reported patient safety events.
A majority of reporters provided their name, indicating that
health care workers in this intensive care setting were will-
ing to be identified and participate in examining patient
safety events. This was also reported by Osmon and col-
leagues10 for the medical ICU. Nonetheless, barriers to
reporting remain. For example, our research coordinators
were aware of unreported events during the course of the
study. Although we did not investigate reporting barriers,
The Journal of Thoracic ansome physicians and nurses verbalized that they were not
sure what to report, that they did not have enough time, or
that they forgot to report. This highlights the need for
ongoing education and support to facilitate reporting by
nurses, physicians, and others who provide patient care.
Another commonly cited and important barrier to compre-
hensive reporting is fear of blame, embarrassment, and
litigation.14,15 It is likely that there will be ongoing reluc-
tance to report events while there is a perception that the
risks of litigation and punishment are high. We did not
directly address this effect in the current study.
Of the categories reported in this study, events related to
medications, tests/treatments/procedures, and equipment/
products were reported most frequently, jointly constituting
more than 60% of all reports. It is difficult to compare these
results with other studies because of differences in methods
and definitions, but it appears that events within these 3
categories are common.4,13,16 In this study, a notable pro-
portion of events resulted in patient harm and additional
tests and treatments, some of which were considered life-
saving interventions, underscoring the importance of error
prevention. Medication and test/treatment/procedure-related
events were the 2 most frequently reported types of events
contributing to patient harm in both the study reporting
system (32% and 29%, respectively) and the on-line report-
ing system (26% and 30%, respectively).
This study also suggests that standardized classification
TABLE 3. When the event occurred in the care process
(n  168)
“When” code n (%)
Procedure 41 (24.4)
Administering treatment or medication 20 (11.9)
Passive care* 15 (8.9)
Ordering 12 (7.1)
Labeling 11 (6.5)
Transcription 11 (6.5)
Preoperative assessment 10 (6.0)
Transfer 10 (6.0)
Dispensing 10 (6.0)
Housekeeping 9 (5.4)
Assessment 3 (1.8)
Rounds assessment 3 (1.8)
Transport 3 (1.8)
Laboratory resulting 3 (1.8)
Activities of daily living 2 (1.2)
Preparing 2 (1.2)
Waiting room or waiting for care (outpatient areas) 1 (0.6)
Documentation 1 (0.6)
Specimen collection 1 (0.6)
*Passive care was defined as any period during which no health care
provider was interacting with the patient.of patient safety events, including errors, near misses, and
d Cardiovascular Surgery ● Volume 130, Number 4 1137.e5
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Coding of the text data proved useful in understanding
reported events from a systems perspective. For example,
although a small proportion of events occurred during pas-
sive care, most of these involved equipment and products
used in patient care, and nearly half contributed to tempo-
rary harm. This information allowed the Quality Improve-
ment Committee to identify opportunities for improvement
and to assign individuals to investigate and institute changes
in the patient care process. However, the classification and
coding process proved to be resource-intensive, requiring
additional data collection for some events (medical record
review, observation of patient or environment, or interview-
ing health care workers) and regular meetings to develop the
coding system and establish consensus.
Few studies thus far have reported on causal classifica-
tion of errors in ICUs. Callum and colleagues8 used the
Medical Event Reporting System for Transfusion Medicine
to report and classify all transfusion-related errors and near-
misses within a teaching hospital. Our study differs from
Callum and associates’ study in that we used a locally
developed reporting system and focused on reporting and
classification of all types of patient safety events in a car-
TABLE 4. Causal classification codes (n  430)
Eindhoven causal code
Definite causes
(n  74)
n (%)
Human factors 35 (47.3)
Slip 11 (14.9)
Coordination 2 (2.7)
Intervention 11 (14.9)
Verification 10 (13.5)
Monitoring 1 (1.4)
Knowledge 0 (0.0)
Qualifications 0 (0.0)
Tripping 0 (0.0)
Organizational factors 13 (17.6)
Protocols/procedures 4 (5.4)
Transfer of knowledge 6 (8.1)
Culture 1 (1.4)
Management priorities 2 (2.7)
External 0 (0.0)
Technical factors 17 (23.0)
Design 12 (16.2)
Materials 2 (2.7)
External 2 (2.7)
Construction 1 (1.4)
Other 9 (12.2)
Patient-related factors 3 (4.1)
Unclassifiable 6 (8.1)diothoracic intensive care environment. Both studies used
1137.e6 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery ● Othe Eindhoven causal classification model and revealed the
same order of frequency for all 4 causal categories: human
factors, organizational factors, technical factors, and patient-
related factors. Multiple causal codes were found for most
events in both studies. Although the causal classification of
events was sometimes time-consuming and difficult, pro-
gressively less time was needed to evaluate and code the
event descriptions as the Eindhoven category extensions
were developed. The extensions were important to ensure
consistency of causal coding. Although a majority of causes
were considered possible, rather than probable or definite,
the information was useful in identifying possible trends
and areas requiring investigation. Further study of the ex-
tension codes will be needed to determine the overall fea-
sibility and usefulness of collecting more detailed cause
data. In this study, classification of the care process step,
brief event description, and cause of the event provided a
practical structure for communicating data to the Quality
Improvement Committee with a summary of classification
coding for each type of event.
This study has several limitations. First, we do not know
with certainty exactly which factors contributed to the in-
crease in reporting. Reporting of risky situations and near
ble causes
 55)
Possible causes
(n  301)
Total causes
(n  430)
n (%) n (%) n (%)
5 (63.6) 135 (44.9) 205 (47.7)
4 (43.6) 41 (13.6) 76 (17.7)
3 (5.5) 38 (12.6) 43 (10.0)
4 (7.3) 20 (6.6) 35 (8.1)
4 (7.3) 14 (4.7) 28 (6.5)
0 (0.0) 12 (4.0) 13 (3.0)
0 (0.0) 6 (2.0) 6 (1.4)
0 (0.0) 4 (1.3) 4 (0.9)
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
0 (18.2) 121 (40.2) 144 (33.5)
1 (1.8) 43 (14.3) 48 (11.1)
0 (0.0) 35 (11.6) 41 (9.5)
6 (10.9) 33 (11.0) 40 (9.3)
3 (5.5) 10 (3.3) 15 (3.5)
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
9 (16.4) 30 (10.0) 56 (13.0)
8 (14.5) 18 (6.0) 38 (8.8)
0 (0.0) 6 (2.0) 8 (1.9)
1 (1.8) 3 (1.0) 6 (1.4)
0 (0.0) 3 (1.0) 4 (0.9)
1 (1.8) 15 (5.0) 25 (5.8)
1 (1.8) 13 (4.3) 17 (4.0)
0 (0.0) 2 (0.7) 8 (1.9)Proba
(n
3
2
1misses, in addition to actual events or errors, was encour-
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first few weeks, and regularly during the remainder of the
study, providing educational materials and in-services. Re-
porters may have preferred the study reporting form because
of limitations of the preexisting on-line system. Another
important factor that may have contributed to increased
reporting is the Hawthorne effect.17,18 This study was con-
ducted in 1 ICU and 1 postanesthesia care unit for patients
undergoing cardiothoracic surgery at a large, urban aca-
demic medical center, and thus our results may not be
generalizable to other hospitals and intensive care settings
with different patient populations, resources, and environ-
ments. We also did not limit the types of events that could
be reported, and a free-text narrative format was used for the
description of events. This made it difficult to categorize
some events and make direct comparisons with other
studies.
One of the strengths of this study is the health care
workers’ willingness to report patient safety events and use
the information for the purpose of preventing future medical
errors and patient harm. Additional studies are needed to
determine whether preventive measures in the intensive care
setting reduce patient harm or the number of patient safety
events. The aim in reporting and analyzing patient safety
events is to identify aspects of practitioner practice or sys-
tem problems that increase the likelihood of errors.19 This
knowledge could inform education programs and guide
institutions in prioritizing system improvements in the in-
tensive care environment. Dedicated resources for this study
allowed for ongoing support and education of health care
workers, and the development and implementation of a
standardized system for the classification of patient safety
events. Participation of both the CTICU and the CTPACU
revealed events that may be unique to those areas, the
cardiothoracic preoperative assessment area and operating
rooms, the cardiothoracic surgery floor, and other areas and
departments of the hospital, representing the entire patient
care continuum in cardiothoracic surgery. Future studies are
needed to evaluate patient safety programs that support
multidepartment, multidisciplinary patient safety reporting
and collaboration.
Conclusion
Instituting a voluntary, accessible patient safety reporting
system with support measures for front-line physicians and
staff demonstrated health care workers’ willingness to use
the system and yielded a broad range of useful patient safety
data pertaining to the entire patient care continuum in car-
diothoracic surgery. Analysis of these data indicates that
patient safety events are multifaceted and often have mul-
tiple causal factors. Application of the Eindhoven causal
classification model as part of a standardized system for
patient safety event coding in the intensive care setting is
The Journal of Thoracic anfeasible and facilitates the local dissemination of important
event-related information, enhancing patient safety and quality
improvement. In our view, this is important to enable the
rational allocation of resources to improve patient safety
and has relevance for other intensive care settings.
We thank the physicians and staff who submitted SAFE reporting
forms, and those who otherwise supported this research project and
implemented changes in the patient care process for the purpose of
improving patient safety.
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Harm scale rating n (%)
Risky situation 23 (14.6)
Near miss 15 (9.6)
No harm event 85 (54.1)
Event with harm: n (%)
Temporary harm 34 (21.7)
Permanent harm 0 (0.0)
Event resulting in death 0 (0.0)
Total 157 (100)
Effect on patient care n (%)
Care not affected 87 (55.4)
Increased level of monitoring or
observation
31 (19.8)
Additional testing required 13 (8.3)
Additional medical or surgical
treatment
17 (10.8)
Life-sustaining
treatment/intervention
6 (3.8)
Unclassifiable* 3 (1.9)
Total 157 (100)ctober 2005
Nast et al Cardiopulmonary Support and PhysiologyTABLE E2. Brief event description (n  192)
“What” root n (%) “What” branch n (% of root)
Procedure 52 (27.1) Inappropriate procedure 33 (63.5)
Delayed procedure 7 (13.5)
Unnecessary risk in procedure 6 (11.5)
Missed procedure 4 (7.7)
Incomplete procedure 1 (1.9)
Clinician disagreement or lack of consensus 1 (1.9)
Medication 52 (27.1) Wrong dose 17 (32.7)
Missed medication 8 (15.4)
Wrong drug 7 (13.5)
Contraindicated medication 5 (9.6)
Extra medication 4 (7.7)
Mislabeled 2 (3.8)
Wrong solution 2 (3.8)
No medication prescribed 1 (1.9)
Wrong frequency 1 (1.9)
Wrong route 1 (1.9)
Wrong method 1 (1.9)
Incompatible mixture 1 (1.9)
Clinician disagreement or lack of consensus 1 (1.9)
Adverse event 1 (1.9)
Equipment or product 30 (15.6) Failed/malfunctioned equipment/product 9 (30.0)
Unavailable equipment/product 5 (16.7)
Dislodged equipment/product 5 (16.7)
Inappropriate equipment/product 3 (10.0)
Unnecessary risk 3 (10.0)
Misuse of equipment/product 2 (6.7)
Inadequate equipment/product 1 (3.3)
Wrong frequency 1 (3.3)
Wrong solution 1 (3.3)
Assessment 20 (10.4) Missed assessment 15 (75.0)
Inadequate assessment 2 (10.0)
No assessment 1 (5.0)
Delayed assessment 1 (5.0)
Adverse event 1 (5.0)
Identification 15 (7.8) Mislabeled 9 (60.0)
Unnecessary risk 4 (26.7)
Inaccurate identification 1 (6.7)
Wrong patient 1 (6.7)
Treatment or test 6 (3.1) No treatment/test 2 (33.3)
Missed treatment/test 2 (33.3)
Delayed treatment/test 2 (33.3)
Documentation 4 (2.1) Unavailable documentation 2 (50.0)
No documentation 1 (25.0)
Incomplete documentation 1 (25.0)
Transport 4 (2.1) Delayed transport 2 (50.0)
Unnecessary risk 2 (50.0)
Reporting 3 (1.6) No reporting 2 (66.7)
Wrong solution 1 (33.3)
Transfer 2 (1.0) Delayed transfer 1 (50.0)
Unnecessary risk 1 (50.0)
Fall 1 (0.5) Unassisted fall 1 (100.0)
Admission 1 (0.5) Delayed admission 1 (100.0)
Other 2 (1.0) Unnecessary risk 2 (100.0)
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